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Since early 1995, monetary stabilization has gradually been achieved in Russia. Ex-
tremely high real interest rate have been maintained throughout autumn 1996, an
exchange rate target has been adhered to since mid-1995, auctions of Central Bank
credit have gained in importance, and subsidized lending has been cut down. How-
ever, the conduct of monetary policy remains a trial-and-error process: Indirect
budget financing through the CBR still occurs, the fixed exchange rate regime has
caused a lack of control over the monetary base, and the money multiplier is rela-
tively unstable. Preliminary empirical evidence shows that money demand has re-
mained relatively stable since the beginning of reforms. Still, short-run fluctuations of
money demand are substantial, and further portfolio adjustments are likely if infla-
tionary expectations decline and if the capital account becomes more open. The
success of monetary stabilization crucially depends on the effectiveness with which
the CBR can defend its independence. Because financial sector stability is an impor-
tant condition for a predictable and stable monetary policy, further measures to re-
structure and to consolidate the banking sector need to be pursued in parallel to
structural reforms of the Russian economy.
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Since the liberalization of prices in January 1992, Russian monetary policy
has been a mirror-image of the overall reform and stabilization process. Several at-
tempts at enforcing tighter monetary conditions and at containing inflation have been
succeeded by periods of monetary expansion and renewed increases of prices
(Graph 1). Although consumer price inflation has fallen continously, there has been a
sustained trend towards stabilization of the monetary sector only since early 1995.
Real interest rates have increased to extremely high positive levels, money growth
has been reduced, and monthly inflation rates have remained in the single digits. The
key question in autumn 1996 is thus whether Russian monetary policy can stay on
this path towards greater monetary stability without imposing unnessesarily harsh li-
quidity constraints on the real sector and without resorting to the monetization of the
budget deficit. Considering the erosion of regular tax revenue of the government that
is taking place,
2 the resulting pressure on the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to
loosen its monetary stance, and the increasing indebtedness of the non-financial
sector, the current stabilization may indeed appear relatively fragile.
In view of the various channels of interaction between the monetary sector
and other reform areas, this paper takes a quite narrowly defined approach. Its main
goal is to assess the track record of Russian monetary policy since 1992. In order to
restrict the analysis, institutional issues such as the independence of the CBR the
prudential regulation of commercial banks, or the situation of the commercial banking
sector are not covered in detail.
3 Rather, the paper starts by analyzing the money
supply process (Part 2). It will be shown that the CBR has had limited power to con-
trol the growth of base money because of budgetary pressure and - since 1995 -
because of the fixed exchange rate regime that has been adopted. Furthermore, the
impact that a change in the monetary base has on broad money supply is deter-
mined by the money multiplier which is largely beyond the control of monetary
authorities. Part 3 analysis the stability and structure of money demand. First, pre-
liminary evidence is presented which indicates that the demand for ruble M2 has re-
mained relatively stable throughout the transformation process, and no significant
structural breaks can be detected. Part 4 studies the sustainability of monetary stabi-
lization and points at the need to coordinate monetary policy with other reform areas.
1 The author would like to thank Jorg Dopke and Mechthild Schrooten for most helpful
comments on an earlier draft. Of course, the author is responsible for all remaining errors
and inaccuracies.
2 The revenue of the budget in percent of GDP has declined from 26.2 percent in 1995 to
23 percent for the first eight months of 1996 (DIW/lfW/IWH, 1996c).
3 See Buch/Schrooten (1996) for an analysis of commercial banks in Russia.2. Money Supply During Transformation
In December 1990, the responsibilities of the Central Bank and of commercial
banks in Russia have been separated and the monobank system, which prevailed
under central planning, has been abolished.
4 At the end of 1991, the Central Bank of
Russia, which had been founded already in July 1990, took over the central banking
responsibilities of the Soviet Gosbank. In principle, the CBR can affect money supply
by influencing the level of base money (B) which is related to total money supply (M)
through the money multiplier (m)
(1) M = m-B
As any other central bank, the CBR has a fairly direct influence only on the monetary
base which sources are composed of a domestic component and of foreign ex-
change reserves. Yet, if the money supply process,can be influenced by political in-
terest groups, even the control of the CBR over the domestic component is not en-
sured. During the transformation process, the political economy of money creation
has certainly changed. Whereas in particular between 1992 and 1993 monetary pol-
icy accomodated the credit demands of state-owned enterprises determined money
supply, the CBR has now a much tighter grip on domestic money creation.
The foreign component of the monetary base is controllable only if flexible ex-
change rates or if capital controls are in place. In a fixed exchange rate system with-
out capital controls, changes in the demand for domestic money will automatically
transmit into changes of foreign exchange reserves. Furthermore, the central bank
cannot control broad money because adjustments in the money multiplier are de-
termined by the behavior of households, firms, and commercial banks. The induced
lack of control over monetary aggregates hampers a policy of monetary targeting, or
may even render it impossible.
More fundamentally, the question has been raised whether central banks in
transition economies should try and target monetary aggregates in the first place.
Because of microeconomic distortions in the financial sector, a policy of monetary
tightening might lead to credit rationing of the private sector and to bankruptcies of
firms which are in principle viable (Bofinger, 1992). Bofingerthus proposes a flexible
monetary policy without the announcement of monetary targets. Other authors, al-
though acknowledging the need to flexibly adjust targets, favor a policy of monetary
targeting over direct inflation or interest rate targets (Ize, 1996).
4 For an overview of banking reform in the former Soviet Union see Buch (1993).This section will thus try to answer the questions whether the CBR could con-
trol the supply of base money, and whether there is a stable relationship between
base money and broader monetary aggregates.
2.1. Instruments of Monetary Policy
Generally, direct and indirect instruments of monetary policy can be distin-
guished (Lindgren, 1991). Through direct instruments, central banks administratively
control the activities of commercial banks by setting the interest rates and/or the
credit volume. Indirect instruments influence the liquidity conditions of banks and - in
a more indirect sense than interest rate controls - the short-run interest rate level of
an economy. These instruments can again be split into two groups. Non-market-
based indirect instruments such as minimum reserve requirements imply an implicit
taxation of the commercial banking sector if deposits with the central bank yield an
interest rate below the market rate. Market-based indirect instruments (rediscount
facilities, open market operations, credit auctions) affect the liquidity of the banking
system by inducing the banks to change their asset structure as a reaction to price
signals.
The choice of the instruments of monetary policy is substantially influenced by
the institutional structure of financial markets. At the beginning of the transformation
process, it may be necessary to rely on fairly direct, non-market-based instruments
of monetary control simply because the effects of more sophisticated instruments are
unknown or because economic agents are unlikely to react to market signals. Yet, in
order to avoid microeconomic distortions to be magnified or even caused by mone-
tary policy, those instruments should be chosen that have the least negative feed-
back effects on the efficiency of the banking system (Buch, 1996). Instruments that
fulfil these requirements are those that (i) do not distort relative prices, (ii) do not pre-
serve oligopolistic market structures, (iii) do not bias the allocation of credit towards
inefficient, state-owned enterprises, and that (iv) provide the commercial banks with
incentives to engage in an active liquidity management. The following sections will
show that the CBR has not always followed this prescription. At least during the first
two years of reforms, the CBR has used fairly direct, non-market-based instruments
of monetary policy. Only gradually have market-based instruments such as credit
auctions gained in importance.2.1.1. Centralized Credit and Financial Repression
Up to early 1994, central bank credits were primarily issued in the form of di-
rected credits. In 1992 and 1993, 104 and 98 percent, respectively, of central bank
lending has been in the form of these loans (IMF, 1994). About 75 percent of the di-
rected credits were channelled through commercial banks directly to enterprises, the
remainder were loans to the government. At the end of 1993, directed credits ac-
counted for almost one fourth of the stock of commercial bank loans. The recipients
of directed credits were determined by a Credit Policy Commission of the CBR and
of the government. Commercial banks could earn a maximum spread of 3 percent-
age points on directed credits. The banks had no incentive to assess the creditwor-
thiness of a borrower or to enforce loan repayment. Instead, politically powerful lob-
byist determined the allocation of credit. It has thus not come to a very big surprise
that most centralized credits have turned out non-performing in the meantime.
The dominance of centralized credits had a quite devastating impact on real
interest rates.
5 Centralized credits usually carry interest rates below the market rate
of interest and thus constitute a subsidy towards the borrower. Because of the domi-
nance of centralized credits and thus the lack of market-based refinancing, the lend-
ing rate of the CBR for commercial banks was highly negative in real terms from the
beginning of 1992 up to late 1993 (Graph 3).
6 The recipients of directed credits, i.e.,
the Ministry of Finance and priority sectors such as agriculture, the fuel and energy
industry, and the Northern territories, thus received substantial subsidies through the
financial system. It has been estimated that the subsidization of the Russian econ-
omy through directed credits amounted to 15.5 percent of GPD in 1992, 5 percent in
1993, and 2.5 percent in 1994 (RETa, Vol. 5 (1)). This form of subsidization has not
been relevant anymore in 1995.
7
5 Ideally, real interest rates would have to be calculated as the difference between the
nominal interest rate and the expected inflation rate. Because data on inflationary expec-
tations cannot be obtained, the current inflation rate has been used as a proxy. Real in-
terest rates are thus equal to the difference between the monthly nominal interest rate
(r
nomlnal) and the monthly increase in prices (AP): r
r8a
l = ((1 + r
nomina
l )/(1 + AP) -1) • 100.
This specification implies that one-time adjustments of prices have an impact on the real
interest rate even if these shifts do not influence inflationary expectations. For the calcu-
lation of real deposit (lending) rates, the consumer (producer) price index CPI (PPI) is
used.
6 On overdraft refinancing credits, a penalty rate of twice the refinancing rate was charged
up to July 1994, this factor has been lowered to 1.3 in July 1994. There is not information
available concerning the enforcement of the penalty.
7 Some sectors still receive low-interest loans. However, these loans are now subsidized
through the budget rather than issued by the CBR.Despite the formal abolition of interest rate controls for commercial banks,
most other relevant interest rates were negative in real terms in 1992 and 1993 as
well. There are at least two explanations for this phenomenon. First, commercial
banks either directly or indirectly through moral suasion were guided by the monetary
authorities to keep lending rates low. Second, because the banks were effectively
shielded from foreign competition, they could retain low deposit rates as well and still
earn a sufficiently high spread on their activities.
The repressed financial system, which characterized the early stages of re-
forms, had negative effects on the efficiency of financial markets. The main incen-
tives of commercial banks and of their customers were to find inflation hedges in or-
der to avoid the erosion of their real wealth. The soft budget constraints of firms were
perpetuated. Because the demand for loans at negative real interest rates is in prin-
ciple infinite, the CBR had to contain credit growth by quantitative controls. Those
large successor banks of the former Soviet Gosbank which were in charge of financ-
ing the state-owned industrial and the agricultural sector - the so-called ..channel
banks" - were the main beneficiaries of the directed lending programs (World Bank,
1993). Because of the prevalence of directed credits, monetary policy in Russia did
not fulfill any of the criteria outlined above, at least up to the end of 1993. Directed
credits have not been priced competitively, they have been channeled only through
selected banks, and they have been biased towards the existing firms.
2.1.2. Refinancing Policies
Interest Rates
The beginning of 1994 marks a shift in the interest rate and credit policy of the
CBR because credit auctions were conducted for the first time. Already during 1993,
the monetary authorities aimed at reducing the gap between the official refinancing
rate and the interbank lending rate. This has been achieved in October 1993. Since
April 1994, the maximum spread between the refinance and the interbank rate has
been set at 4 percentage points. Because of the short-term nature of credit auctions
- the maximum maturity has been 2 months -, the stock of these loans has re-
mained fairly small. In 1994, auction credit contributed only 1.6 percent to total credit
growth; for the first seven months of 1996, this share was 11.5 percent.
8
8 These numbers have been calculated from various issues of IFS and RETa.Reflecting an increase in inflation towards the end of 1994 and a temporary
decline of nominal interest rates, real interest rates showed a declining trend
throughout 1994 and eventually turned negative again in the last months of the year.
This return to negative real interest rates after an initial upswing at the beginning of
the year could be avoided in 1995. Another major difference between the develop-
ment of interest rates in 1994 and in 1995 is striking. Both the official refinancing rate
and the auction rate have substantially exceeded the interbank rate on short-term
loans during a sustained period in 1995 and in the first half year of 1996. The official
CBR refinancing rate has thus for the first time during the transformation process be-
come the marginal sources of refinancing for commercial banks. The substantial in-
crease in the cost of refinancing prompted a declined reliance of the commercial
banks on central bank credit. Between December 1993 and July 1996, the impor-
tance of CBR credit as a source of finance for the commercial banks dropped from
14 to 4.8 percent of commercial banks' liabilities and equity (Table 2). Interestingly,
the quite substantial interest rate gap between the refinancing rate and the interbank
rate did not induce a substantial increase in the use of money market instruments
which in July 1996 only accounted for 4.2 percent of liabilities' and equity.
Design of Credit Auctions
Auctions of credit resources in transition economies - while generally consti-
tuting a welcomed move to a more market-based allocation of central bank credit -
must be carefully designed (Saal/Zamalloa, 1995). Because of asymmetries in infor-
mation on the quality of banks, central banks may end up with a pool of risky bor-
rowers due to adverse selection effects. In addition, uncompetitive market structures
may lead to collusion among banks, thus repressing interest rates. There are two
ways of preventing asymmetries in information and collusion from distorting the out-
come of credit auctions.
9 First, the access to auction credit should be based on the
provision of collateral. Because of the lack of assets which might serve as collateral,
government bonds and foreign exchange accounts can be used in the short-run. In
the medium-term, the securitization of enterprise debt should be promoted in order to
de-link monetary policy and the financing of the government deficit.
Second, access to credit auctions should follow clear and transparent rules,
and only solvent banks should be admitted. Improved banking supervision can help
to classify banks, and the access of banks to the interbank market can be taken as
9 Furthermore, credit auctions are ill-suited to withdraw liquidity from the market if the cen-
tral bank wishes to sterilize the impact of inflows of foreign capital on the monetary base
(Ize, 1996).10
an indicator of solvency. Anecdotal evidence from Russia indeed suggests that ac-
cess to the interbank market is guided by solvency indicators. After a liquidity crisis
on the interbank market in August 1995, commercial banks confined lending to the
best borrowers, they demanded the provision of collateral such as government
bonds (GKOs), and they required the disclosure of financial information (Winkler,
1996).
Commercial banks that participate in credit auctions of the CBR also have to
fulfill certain solvency requirements (IMF, 1994). The limit for borrowing on credit
auctions has been set at twice the capital of the bank or 10 percent of its assets,
whichever is lower. Since the beginning of March 1996, access to Central Bank refi-
nancing credit is based on the provision of collatera, mainly government bonds. The
maximum maturity of credit disbursed through this Lombard facility is 30 days; the
volume of credit and the type of the credit auction are determined by Board of Direc-
tors of the CBR (RETa, Vol. 5, No. 1). In April and May 1996, seven Lombard credit
auctions were conducted (CBRa, 7(38), 1996). Altogether 1,200 billion ruble were
offered, but only 475 billion ruble or 40 percent were actually taken up by the banks.
This amount is almost as high as the volume of loans that was extended through
credit auctions in 1995 (538.3 billion ruble). Interest rates on Lombard credits varied
between 45 and 63 percent in April and May, and were thus less than half of the of-
ficial refinancing rate at that time (120 percent). This interest rate differential can be
justified by the fact that loans which are backed by collateral carry a comparatively
low credit risk.
In principle, the move from the use of directed credit to market-based, collat-
eralized lending to commercial banks marks an important shift in the lending policy of
the CBR. It must be noted, however, that the refinancing facility may also be used to
indirectly finance the budget deficit. In 1996, the interest rate on government bonds
has temporarily exceeded the official refinancing rate. Because commercial banks
use government bonds as collateral for borrowing from the CBR, this opens an inter-
est rate window, and the banks can make an arbitrage profit from buying government
bonds with central bank loans. In response to such arbitrage opportunities and to
their need for safe assets, commercial banks have substantially restructured their
balance sheets towards claims on the government. These claims have increased in
importance from 5.2 percent of total assets at the end of 1994 to 17.9 percent in De-




0 Out of all securities in the banks' portfolio at the end of June 1996, more than two-thirds
were state securities (CBRa, 8(39), 1996).11
2.1.3. Minimum Reserves
The CBR has frequently adjusted the minimum reserve requirement for com-
mercial banks. On average, minimum reserves, which do not pay interest, have been
relatively high (20 percent on demand deposits) and have thus constituted a quite
substantial cost for the banks. Assuming that banks use demand deposits only to fi-
nance loans as their only assets, a 20 percent reserve requirement cet. par. implies
an interest rate spread of 25 percent of the deposit rate.
In February 1994, reserve requirements were adjusted to 20 percent of ruble
demand deposits and 15 percent of other interest-bearing ruble deposits; no reserve
requirements applied to foreign exchange deposits. At about the same time, case-by-
case exceptions, which freed certain banks from meeting reserve requirements, were
abolished (IMF, 1994). In February 1995, minimum reserve requirements were set at
22 percent on demand deposits and time deposits up to 30 days, 15 percent on time
deposits between 30 and 90 days, 10 percent on deposits over 90 days, and 2 per-
cent on foreign exchange deposits (Sokolov et al, 1996). These rates were tempo-
rarily lowered in May 1996 and have been raised again in July to 20 percent on de-
posits with a maturity of less than 30 days, to 16 percent on deposits with a maturity
of 31-90 days, to 12 percent on deposits with a maturity of more than 90 days, and to
2.5 percent on foreign exchange deposits (Seeberg/Winkler, 1996). This last in-
crease in minimum reserves came as a response to a profit transfer to the budget
which had been ordered by the government (Kommersant, 1996), and which is not
backed by the regulations of the Central Bank Law. Effective November 1, 1996, re-
serve requirements for ruble deposits have been lowered slightly and those for for-
eign currency deposits have been raised in order to increase the attractiveness of
holding ruble deposits (OMRI, 31.10.1996).
2.1.4. Exchange Rate Policy
Up to mid-1992, Russia maintained the Soviet multiple exchange rate regime
with differentiated exchange rates for tourists foreign trade, or capital account trans-
actions. After the unification of the exchange rate between the Russian ruble and the
US-Dollar in July 1992 (Buch et al., 1995), the CBR has frequently intervened in the
foreign exchange market but did not announce any exchange rate target up to mid-
1995.
1
1 In January 1995, the maximum daily deviation of the exchange rate was set
1
1 For details on the exchange rate policy and foreign exchange regulations see the various
issues of DIW/lfW/IWH.12
at 10 percent. An exchange rate target of 4,300-4,900 ruble per US-Dollar has for the
first time been announced in July 1995 and remained unchanged until the end of that
year. In January 1996, the corridor was adjusted to 4,550-5,150 ruble for the first six
months of that year. In July 1996, the CBR announced the move to a ..crawling" ex-
change rate corridor which is intended to shift on a daily basis while maintaining a
width of 600 ruble (RETb, 16.7.1996). In June 1996, current account convertibility of
the ruble as required under the IMF's Article VIII has been introduced while restric-
tions on the capital account are being maintained (EIU, 1996). Although the entry of
foreign investors into the Russian capital market has been liberalized somewhat, en-
try barriers will remain in place at least until the end of 1997. Foreign banks can only
enter the Russian market after they have received a license from the CBR, and the
maximum amount of foreign capital in the Russian banking system has been re-
stricted to 12 percent.
2.2. The Structure of Base Money
The use of centralized credit facilities, the structure of the Russian capital
market, and the exchange rate policy have influenced the process of base money
creation. This section shows which impact these factors had on monetary policy.
2.2.1. The Endogeneity of Money Supply
The close interaction between monetary policies and quasi-fiscal activities
1
2 in
transition economies implies that a central bank may not be able to credibly commit
itself to the announcement of a monetary target which disregards the credit needs of
the budget and of state-owned enterprises. A part of the money supply in transition
economies may thus be endogenously determined (Bofinger, 1994). Through its ac-
cess to refinancing credit of the central bank, the (quasi-) fiscal sector receives
seigniorage revenue.
1
3 The extent to which such revenues can be obtained depends




2 The quasi-fiscal deficit comprises the official government deficit plus the deficits/losses of
extrabudgetory funds, state-owned enterprises, and banks.
1
3 There are two concepts for the calculation of seigniorage (Klein/Neumann, 1990): (i) The
opportunity cost concept considers seigniorage as the interest expense saved by the
government if it obtains an interest-free loan from the central bank. Seigniorage is thus
equal to the nominal interest rate on government bonds times the real stock of base
money; (ii) monetary seigniorage treats the revenue of the government as the change in
the real stock of money.
1
4 At the same time, it must be borne in mind that central bank independence is only a
necessary, not a sufficient condition for monetary stability.13
"lorn
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The institutional framework in which the CBR has been operating has indeed
been conducive to undermining its autonomy. Throughout the years 1992 to 1994,
the Central Bank Law did not even formally establish the independence of the
monetary authorities from the government. Rather, the head of the Central Bank was
a member of the government, and monetary policy was de facto determined by po-
litical considerations. A new Law of the Central Bank, which has been passed in
January 1995, intended to establish central bank independence, but has thus far
only succeeded partially (DIW/lfW/IWH, 1995a). The CBR has to report on its activi-
ties to the parliament, and its decisions still need to be coordinated with a banking
committee of the government. Although the government may in principle not receive
credits from the CBR, exceptions to this rule may be specified in the budgetary law.
Against this background, the success of the CBR with containing inflation is quite
remarkable.
Generally, there are four different, albeit related, channels through which a
transformation-induced endogeneity of the money supply can arise:
• Insolvent, state-owned firms can be financed directly by the monetary authorities.
These loans to enterprises would be channelled through the banking system but
are essentially earmarked for special recipients. Such indirect subsidies in the
form of directed credits have indeed been one main driving force behind monetary
expansion in 1992 and 1993 (Section 2.1.1.).
• The ^location of directed credits is a first step which leads to a build up of non-
performing loans on the balance sheets of banks and thus to banking distress.
1
5
Hence, a second channel emerges if insolvent banks are kept liquid through the
refinancing facilities of the central bank even if the losses of enterprises have
been fully consolidated into the budget. Facing a large number of distressed fi-
nancial institutions, it may be in the interest of the central bank to provide insolvent
banks with low-interest refinancing credits if it assigns a positive weight to the
stability of the banking system. After the liquidity crisis on the Russian interbank
market in August 1995, for example, the CBR provided the banks with liquidity at
the amount of 1.9 Trillion ruble (2 percent of the monetary base) (DIW/lfW/IWH,
1995b).
• The substitution of bank credit by trade credit can eventually counteract restrictive
monetary policies (Abel/Siklos, 1994). A decline in the real stock of bank credit
1
5 In a situation of banking distress, commercial banks are insolvent but not illiquid because
they can obtain additional funds from the central bank and/or from depositors. Banking
distress thus turns into a banking crisis if these refinancing opportunities dry up.14
may imply that firms have less working capital available to finance production in-
puts.
1
6 Upon a tightening of (central) bank credits, enterprises can obtain addi-
tional liquidity by falling into arrears with their suppliers. Although interenterprise
debt is not included in the traditional money stock, it may be monetized by the
monetary authorities and could thus be an indicator of (future) monetary expan-
sion. Firms will actually gamble on this option the more frequent bail-outs have




• While the financing needs of state-owned enterprises, the insolvency of banks,
and the emergence of interenterprise credit have occured in virtually all transition
economies, the political goal to provide.(soft) loans to the successor states of the
former Soviet Union has been a unique feature of the transition in Russia. Until
the ruble zone broke up in June 1993, the non-Russian "successor states of the
Soviet Union had the possibility to create non-cash rubles but the authority to is-
sue cash ruble was retained by the CBR.
1
8 Hence, the eventual accommodation
of the issuance of ruble cash through loans to the successor states undermined
Russian monetary autonomy. New lending to these states, however, was stopped
in 1994.
While there is some evidence on the provision of directed credits or of emer-
gency loans to firms, banks, and other successor states (Section 2.2.2), the impact
of interenterprise debt on monetary policy is more difficult to detect. Data which is
available on the payables and receivables of enterprises since mid-1992 allow a first
assessment whether the monetization of enterprise arrears has had an impact on
monetary policy. Both payables and receivables of enterprises moved relatively in
parallel, with gross receivables exceeding payables because of net claims on firms
outside Russia. Between July 1992 and March 1993, real receivables declined
sharply by about 75 percent which is mainly due to a netting of claims and to im-
provements in the payments system (Kim/Kwon, 1995). Graph 2 shows that there is
some evidence that - at least since late 1993 - bank loans and interenterprise debt
1
6 Calvo and Coricelli (1992) have made such a credit crunch responsible for the output de-
cline in Eastern Europe. However, a decline in the stock of real credit also indicates that
the debt servicing requirements of the enterprise sector fall, thus improving the financial
position of firms (Schmieding, 1993).
1
7 Kim and Kwon (1995) show that interenterprise arrears will occur in transition economies
even if budget constraints of firms are relatively hard and if monetary policy remains un-
changed.
1
8 Hardy and Lahiri (1996) analyze the effects of this cash shortage on the economies of the




9 While this observation may also be explained by a third, omitted
variable which drives both time series, the graph also shows that the positive corre-
lation between the series ended in early 1995. Since then, real bank loans declined,
while real enterprise debt increased. This can be interpreted as weak evidence that
banks have been less willing to refinance the debt of enterprises since early 1995.
2.2.2. Determinants of the Monetary Base
The asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet shows the sources of
base money growth and gives some indication concerning the financing of the
(quasi-) fiscal deficit. Between 1994 and 1996, net domestic assets have overall
been the driving force behind money growth (Table 3). As a result, they exceeded
the targets agreed upon by the IMF and the Central Bank from May 1996 onwards.
2
0
The structure of the balance sheet of the CBR shows that claims on the government
increased in importance in 1994, declined somewhat in 1995, and rose again in 1996
(Table 4). These claims also include government bonds bought by the CBR. Report-
edly, the CBR has at the end of 1994 recommended to finance the budget deficit
through the issuance of bonds which would then be bought by the bank (Sokolov et
at., 1996). In parallel to the increase of claims on the government, claims on banks
declined from 19 to 7 percent of assets.
During much of 1995 and in the first quarter of 1996, net foreign assets in-
creased quite substantially. This increase in foreign assets reflects the adoption of
the fixed exchange rate regime which forced the CBR to absorb capital inflows.
These capital inflows came in response to the stabilization of the nominal exchange
rate and to high real interest rates which resulted from of backward-looking inflation-
ary expectations (Ize, 1996). The CBR reacted by unsterilized intervention, and by
allowing some appreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Because of a lack of open
market operations,
2
1 sterilized interventions, which would require a decline in net
domestic assets, were difficult to achieve. Still, the inflationary impact of the capital
inflows has been relatively modest. The inflows mainly reflected a return of hoarded
foreign exchange, and the increased money supply was partly absorbed by an in-
creased demand for money.
1
9 Data on interenterprise credit is identical to the payables to enterprises (RETa). To some
extent, the relatively sharp increase in January 1994 is attributable to a break in the time
series.
2
0 See RETa (Vol. 5, No. 1) and RETb (13.9.1996).
2
1 Only since late October 1996 has the CBR offered overnight loans through repurchase
agreements.16
Considering the impact that the financing of the (quasi)-fiscal deficit and the
fixing of the foreign exchange rate had on money supply, the question arises as to
why inflation could be contained quite successfully. Apart from a general trend to-
wards a decline in inflation because of the reduced scope for adjustments in relative
prices, two observations can be made. First, the nominal growth of the monetary
base has been continuously reduced. In 1995, the CBR has particularly cut down
growth of credit to the banking sector which declined quite substantially in real terms.
This reduction of lending to banks, together with the move to high real interest rates,
has been one cause of the liquidity crisis in the banking system in August 1995.
Second, a downward trend in the income velocity of money (Section 3.1), and thus
an increase in money holdings, has reduced the inflationary impact of a given in-
crease in the money stock.
As regards the uses of the money base, the CBR accomodated the initial fall
in cash money balances after the liberalization of prices in January 1992. Between
May and September 1992, real cash money increased to a post-liberalization high.
The share of cash in total CBR assets has continued to rise from 23 to 36 percent
between late 1993 and mid-1996. In real terms, however the stock of cash money
showed a downward trend, combined with strong seasonal upswings. Deposits of
commercial banks, comprising mandatory and excess reserves, have slightly de-
clined in importance and virtually stopped to increase in 1996. Mainly, this decline is
driven by a fall in excess reserves which where reduced from 80 percent of total re-
serves at the end of 1992 to 62 percent in June 1996 (RETa). This fall can be attrib-
uted to improvements in the payments systems and to a better liquidity management
of the commercial banks.
2.3. The Money Multiplier
The supply of base money in Russia has quite strongly been influenced by
political considerations and by the exchange rate regime that has been adopted.
Even if these factors were not relevant, the question is whether the CBR could in
principle gain greater influence over overall money supply by bringing base money
under its control. Broad money supply depends also on the money multiplier, that is
on the behavior of banks and non-banks. Transformation of (1) by making use of the
definition of the monetary base by its uses B = CC + RR + ER (CC = currency, RR =





cc + rr + er17
where cc = the ratio of currency to total deposits in the banking system, and rr (er) =
the ratio of required (excess) reserves to total deposits. Changes in broad money are
thus the sum of changes in the monetary base and in the money multiplier
/^.n ... ,n dm _ dm _ ... dm _ dm .
(1 dM = m-dB+ B + B with —<0,— <0
dr dc dr dc
The CBR does have a direct influence only on the ratio of required reserves to de-
posits. As far as the other two components of the money multiplier as well as the to-
tal money supply are concerned, the central bank has both a control and an informa-
tion problem (Neumann/von Hagen, 1987). In fact, a statistically significant relation-
ship between base and broad money could not be established.
The control problem emerges because changes in the portfolio structure of
households as well as in the excess reserve holdings of commercial banks cannot be
predicted accurately. Unexpected changes in cash demand and of the currency ratio
may be particularly high during the early reform period when the separation between
cash and non-cash monetary circuits is lifted, and when the seasonal pattern of the
demand for cash is unknown as yet. Generally, households will decrease their cash
holdings if more interest bearing financial assets, which raise the opportunity costs of
holding cash, become available. The introduction of new payment techniques may, in
addition, reduce the transaction demand for cash money. Also, there is no more
need to hold cash balances for the purchases of previously rationed consumer
goods. During transformation, excess reserves and thus excess liquidity in the
banking system are furthermore likely to be high and difficult to predict (Balino et al.,
1994). Banks will raise their voluntary excess reserves if no other liquid investment
opportunities are available. In addition, involuntary excess reserves will be caused by
inefficiencies in the payments system. If the payments system is organized by the
central bank, excess reserves reflect the float that originates from settlement delays.
Hence, while excess reserves can in the long run be expected to decline due to a
more efficient organization of the payments system, temporary upswings may occur.
Yet, if excess reserve holdings are high, changes in the required reserve ratio may
leave the money multiplier and thus money supply unaffected because banks can
simply convert excess into required reserves.
Graph 4 shows the development of the components of the money multiplier.
For 1993, only aggregated data for the multiplier of ruble M2 have been available.
Between the last quarter of 1992 and the third quarter of 1993, the ruble multiplier
declined quite substantially. A given increase of base money thus transmitted into18
smaller changes of M2. After some stabilization until the third quarter of 1994, the
multiplier increased sharply towards the beginning of 1995, but this increase gradu-
ally levelled off thereafter. These basic trends are the same for the multiplier of broad
money, which includes foreign currency deposits. Most of the variation in the broad
money multiplier is caused by swings in the currency ratio. The reserve ratio has
declined rather continuously from the end of 1993 to the first quarter of 1996, which
by itself would imply an increase in the multiplier. There was an increase in the re-
serve ratio only in the third quarter of 1994, possibly as a result of the currency crisis
in October. The currency ratio, instead, declined in 1994, and rose to its early-1994
level during 1995. One possible explanation of the increase in the currency ratio in
1995 is the fact that solvency problems of commercial banks were increasingly
brought to the surface. Hence, households and firms may have reacted to the per-
ceived risk of loosing their deposits by holding more currency. In addition, the decline
in the inflation rate reduced the opportunity costs of cash holdings.
Central banks not only lack the means to influence the supply of broad money,
they also have an information problem because they observe the behavior of the
money stock with a time lag. Whereas the monetary base comprises liabilities of the
central bank that are readily observable, the money stock consists of liabilities of the
commercial banking system. In order to observe the actual money supply, the CBR
thus depends on information that it receives from the commercial banks. During the
transformation process, this kind of information is likely to be inaccurate and delayed.
The accounting system and thus the definition of monetary aggregates in the social-
ist banking system differed markedly from the accounting standards in a market
economy. Substantial structural breaks in the time series occur as a result of the in-
troduction of new reporting standards. The experience from Russia is quite illustra-
tive in this regard.
2
2 Up to early 1995, two so-called ..investment accounts" existed.
Both of these were included in the stock of money up to January 1995. After one of
these accounts has been dropped from the calculation, reported broad money fell.
As for ruble M2, short-term foreign currency deposits were occasionally reported by
the commercial banks until the end of 1994. In addition to these conceptional prob-
lems, there are at least three different time series for M2 in circulation which are all
claimed to be official, and which are reported by different departments of the CBR.
These factors have caused substantial delays, inaccuracies and revisions of the
monetary data and complicate the analysis of Russian monetary policy.
2
2 The following information has been obtained from Roland Nash who has been in charge
of the monetary statistics at the Russian European Centre for Economic Policy.19
2.4. Money and Credit
Increases in ruble M2 have not automatically been transmitted in increases of
bank loans to enterprises and households (Graph 2), at least since early 1995. While
the two time series have moved relatively in parallel in 1994, an increase in real M2
has been accompanied by a decline in real credit since the first quarter of 1995. A
reduced propensity to lend to firms is also evidenced by the structure of the balance
sheet of commercial banks (Table 2) as claims on firms declined from 59 to 51 per-
cent of assets between 1993 and 1996. At the same time, the share of claims on the
state sector in total claims on firms and households declined from 44 to 34 percent.
This may imply that, despite a reduction of lending to firms, private sector firms have
suffered less than state firms. Because of the impossibility to distinguish new private
firms from firms in mixed ownership or firms with a dominant state shareholder, how-
ever, no definite conclusions can be drawn. The consolidated accounts of the
monetary authorities and the commercial banks also reveal that claims on the central
government have increased in importance since 1994 (Table 1). While in 1994 the
increase in claims on private and state-owned firms could explain 48 percent of
broad money growth, this share had come down to about 30 percent in the first half
of 1996. Over the same period, claims on the government increased in importance
from 35 to 77 percent.20
3. The Structure of Money Demand
3.1 Money Demand and Velocity
In order to determine the effects of an increase in money supply on prices and
output it needs to be assumed that the money market is in equilibrium.
2
3 The effects
of changes in money supply can thus only be determined if information about the
structure of money demand is given. The importance of the stability of money de-
mand for monetary targeting can be shown with the quantity equation which relates
(percentage) changes in prices (P) to changes in the stock of money (M), in the in-
come velocity of money (V), and in real income (Y)
(2) P = M + V - Y
Price increases are proportional to a rise in the money stock and in the income ve-
locity of money, reduced by the amount of increases in real income. Taking the ex-
pansion of real output as exogenous in the long-run, there is a stable relationship
between the stock of money and prices only if the demand for money is itself a sta-
ble function. Money demand, in turn, depends on the opportunity costs of holding
money, on income, and on real wealth.
During the transformation process, money demand is likely to undergo major
changes which tend to complicate a policy of monetary targeting. Such transforma-
tion-related shifts in money demand mainly have two causes (Khan/Sundararajan,
1992). First, one-time structural shifts occur if administrative restrictions are abol-
ished. Because decisions of banks and non-banks in the socialist banking system
were highly regulated by direct controls on holding certain monetary assets and on
interest rates, agents are likely to adjust their portfolios to the desired composition
after these controls are lifted. Second, the money demand function itself may change
during transformation. Most importantly, a hardening of the budget constraints of
enterprises will lead to an increased interest elasticity of money demand of the cor-
porate sector. Prior to their privatization and to the enforcement of a bankruptcy law,
banks and enterprises react to price signals only to a limited degree. A policy which
aims at limiting the amount of liquidity in the system by raising the interest rate for
central bank credits may thus be ineffective. Furthermore, to the extent that real in-
terest rates turn negative, households and enterprises will resort to inflation hedges,
2
3 Some theories such as the buffer stock approach allow for a short-term deviation from the
long-run equilibrium (Willms/Clausen, 1995).21
and they will particularly increase their holdings of foreign currency (dollarization).
2
4
These considerations imply that monetary targets would need to be adjusted to
structural shifts in money demand. Once a target has been set and money demand
increases, sticking to the original target would lead to an overly restrictive monetary
policy, and vice versa. This trial and error process, however, should be clear and
transparent to the public in order to minimize the scope for a destabilization of the
private sector. Generally, if the structural shifts of money demand have occurred and
if the budget constraints of firms have been reasonably hardened, a rule-based
monetary policy becomes more feasible.
The measurement of the income velocity of money is additionally complicated
by a transformation-specific factor. Private sector activity is often not fully reflected in
production statistics. If private sector production is contributing an increasing share
to total output, actual GDP rises over measured GDP. As a consequence, measure-
ment of velocity which only takes measured GDP into account will lead to an under-
estimation of the true income velocity of money. Mismeasurement of private sector
activity is in fact a quite important factor in the Russian economy. Estimates put the
share of the pure private sector in total GDP to 25 percent in 1994, the non-state
sector contributed an even higher share of 62 percent to GDP.25 To the extent that
the private sector has gradually gained in importance - the pure private sector ac-
counted only for 5.3 percent of output in 1989 -, and that this increase is insuffi-
ciently reported, velocity is thus increasingly underestimated.
Between mid-1992 and mid-1996, there has been no large overall change in
the income velocity of the ruble money stock (Graph 5). Since the first quarter of
1994 - consistent earlier data for the broad money stock have not been available -
ruble M2 and broad M2 have moved relatively in parallel. This indicates that the
share of foreign currency holdings has remained relatively constant.26 The share of
cash holdings (MO) in M2 has increased from 24 to 37 percent between 1992 and
1996, thus causing a greater rise of M2 than of MO velocity. There is thus no evi-
dence for the prior presumption that the transformation process has led to a decline
in cash holdings. Because velocity has been calculated on the basis of monthly data
for both money and GDP, some seasonal pattern of money demand become evi-
2
4 See Diehl (1996) on the experience with dollarization in transition economies.
2
5 These data have been taken from EBRD (1995). The non-state sector comprises collec-
tive farms and companies with minority private ownership.
2
6 Underlying this measure of dollarization is the difference between ruble M2 as reported in
Russian Economic Trends and broad money reported by the IMF. Hence, only officially
recorded foreign exchange holdings are taken into account.22
dent. Velocity tends to increase - and thus money demand to fall - towards the end
of the first and third quarter of each year.
3.2. Estimation of a Money Demand Function
3.2.1 Model Specification
27
The empirical estimation of a money demand function for the transformation
period in Russia is, most importantly, complicated by the lack of long-run time series.
Only short-run series, covering essentially four years of the post-reform period, have
been available. This has at least three implications. First, finding a stable relationship
in the data is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for long-run stability of money
demand. Because the short-run demand for money is relatively unstable even in de-
veloped market economies (Willms/Clausen, 1995), it may not even be feasible to
find a stable structure in the data. At the same time, the reaction of money demand
and thus the transmission of monetary impulses into prices may be relatively fast in
Russia because the financial system is not very sophisticated. The time period for
the transmission of monetary impulses into prices has been estimated to be about 4
months (Koen/Marrese, 1995). This is considerably shorter than in developed market
economies. Second, consistent time series have only been available for a relatively
small number of variables. The choice of explanatory variables has thus mainly been
guided by data availability, and different model specifications could hardly be tested.
Third, all tests are performed on a relatively small sample of 52 monthly observations
(6:1992 - 9:1996) and thus have a considerable margin of error. Support for a cer-
tain hypothesis may thus only be found because of the small sample size. The re-
sults therefore have to be interpreted with extreme caution, and future research will
have to confirm the main findings.
Generally, money demand depends on realincome, wealth, and on the oppor-
tunity costs of holding money. Whether there is a stable long-run relationship be-
tween these variables can be tested with an error-correctidn-model (ECM)
n-1 m-1
(3) AM2R, =(a0-
where M2R = demand for real ruble M2, and X = the set of explanatory variables. All
variables are expressed in logarithms and have been seasonally adjusted by a sim-
2
7 All estimates have been made with the statistical software package EViews 2.0. For de-
tails see EViews (1994/95).23
pie multiplicative technique which averages the ratios of a series relative to a cen-
tered moving average for a given season. The error correction model in (3) can be
derived from a general rational lag distribution and does therefore not restrict the dy-
namic structure of the model (Hansen, 1993: 133n). The specification implies that
changes in money demand depend (i) on deviations from long-run-equilibrium, i.e.,
on the error-correction term in brackets, and (ii) on short-run effects of changes in
the exogenous and in the lagged endogenous variables. If the coefficient (a0 -1) is
significantly less than zero, money demand declines (increases) if it has been above
(below) its equilibrium level in the previous period. There would thus be a stationary
long-run relationship between the variables, i.e., the variables would be cointegrated.
The variables have been specified as follows:
• Real money demand is given by the nominal stock of ruble M2, deflated with con-
sumer prices.
• Real income has been proxied by real monthly GDP, the index of retail sales, or
the disposable income of households. However, as will be explained below, none
of these variables was found to have a significant impact on money demand.
Since a variable measuring real wealth has not been available, it has been as-
sumed that (changes of) real income is a reasonably good proxy.
• The opportunity costs of holding money have been captured through the return on
domestic and foreign financial assets. The domestic interest rate level has been
proxied by the refinancing rate of the CBR because of the lack of sufficiently long
time series for other interest rates. The return on foreign financial assets is given
by the foreign interest rate times the expected rate of depreciation of the domestic
currency. Under the assumption of perfect financial markets, the return on domes-
tic and foreign assets must be identical (uncovered interest parity)
(4) (i + i) = (i + i*)^
where i (i*) = domestic (foreign) interest rate, e (e
e) = current (expected) exchange
rate. If the expected return on foreign money increases, domestic money is re-
placed by foreign currency (currency substitution).
2
8 One key problem in finding a
variable representing the RHS of equation (4) is the lack of a forward market for
foreign exchange. Hence, a reliable estimate of exchange rate expectations is not
2
8 Filosa (1995: 25) analyzes money demand functions for a sample of Western European
countries and finds no evidence to reject the hypothesis that currency substitutions has
an impact on money demand. One main reason why currency substitution has become an
issue in Western Europe is that regulations on capital account transactions have been
lifted. In Russia, in contrast, currency substitution has occurred on a large scale despite
the maintenance of formal restrictions on convertibility as a response to high domestic in-
flation, negative real domestic interest rates, and political instability.24
available. As will be explained below, the only variable with a significant impact on
money demand has been the current exchange rate.
Economic theory predicts that the demand for ruble M2 should react posi-
tively to an increase in real income because an increase in income raises the trans-
action demand for money, and negatively to increases in the domestic interest rate
because of the higher opportunity cost of holding money. The reaction to an increase
of the exchange rate (depreciation) is somewhat undetermined. On the one hand, a
higher exchange rate lowers the opportunity costs of obtaining domestic currency,
which should raise demand for domestic money. On the other hand, an increase in
the exchange rate may be taken as an indicator of a future devaluation and would
thus lower demand for ruble M2. Under the extreme assumption of static expecta-
tions, the current exchange rate would be the only variable on which expectations
are based.
3.2.2 Augmented Dickey-Fuller-Test (ADF-Test) for Integration
In order to apply a test on cointegration, the variables must be integrated of
the same order. Hence, before estimating the money demand function (3), an
(augmented) Dickey-Fuller-Test is performed which tests for the stationarity of the
variables specified above. This is done by running a regression for the first difference
of each seasonally adjusted variable X, including all exogenous and endogenous
variables, on its lagged level and on its first differences
(5) AXt=a0 Xl_1-£alAXt_i + et i=0
The hypothesis Ho: ao = O that the variable X is non-stationary is tested against the
hypothesis H,: ao<O, i.e., X is stationary. The lag-length has been extended such
that the residuals e, in (5) are white noise. A trend and/or a constant term have been
included in the equations on the basis of the visual inspection of the.time series
(Graph 6). The critical values for the t-ratios of a0 depend on the value of the con-
stant term in the equation (Hansen, 1993: 145n). If |t|>|t*|, X is at least 1(1), i.e., it
has to be differenced once to become stationary. Similarly, running the ADF-test for
the differenced variables implies a test of Ho: X is l(2).
Table 5 shows that the hypothesis that the refinancing rate, real money de-
mand, and the exchange rate are 1(1) is not rejected at a 5-percent level of confi-25
dence while the first differences are stationary.
2
9 This result is consistent with the
findings of Korhonen (1996) who shows that the Russian consumer price index, M2,
and the refinancing rate of the CBR are 1(1). The only variable for which the hy-
pothesis of non-stationarity can be rejected is real GDP. The same result was ob-
tained if the index of retail sales has been used as a proxy of real income. Because
economic theory suggests that real income should have a significant impact on
money demand, GDP may still be included if it would add to the explanatory power of
the model and to the stability of the long-run relationship between the variables.
However, since both real GDP and retail sales had the wrong coefficient and were
insignificant, they have been dropped from the equation. One explanation for the low
significance level of the income variable is that reported GDP captures only a fraction
of the actual transactions taking place. The result thus supports the hypothesis that
money demand mainly depends on nominal rather than real variables, as under
conditions of hyperinflation (Taylor, 1991). This seems to hold even though Russia
has experienced an inflation rate exceeding the hyperinflation benchmark (50 per-
cent per month) only once, in January 1992.
3.2.3 Estimation of the EC-Model
The next step is to estimate whether there is a stable cointegration relation-
ship among the variables in (3). The appropriate lag length for the first differences of
real money demand, the exchange rate, and the refinancing rate has been specified
by choosing the largest absolute value of the Schwarz and the Akaike information
criterion. A maximum lag length of four months has been allowed for. The following
equation has been estimated
3
0
AM2R= 2.07 -0.70M2R.1 -0.001 REF_i - 0.09 E_-| + 0.61 AM2R_-|
(7.38) (-7.52) (-4.34) (-5.86) (5.98)
+ 0.29 AM2R.2 + 0.32 AM2R_4 + 0.001 AREF.4+ 0.13 AE .3 - 0.14 DUMMY
(2.69) (2.80) (2.07) (2.02) (-3.87)
0')
R
2 = 0.66 F-statistic = 11.97 Akaike info criterion = - 6.23
Schwarz criterion = - 5.88
t-ratios in brackets; sample (adjusted) 1992:6 - 1996:9; 52 observations
2
9 If a 10% level of confidence is used as a benchmark, the hypothesis that the exchange
rate is l(0) cannot be rejected. Because of the significant impact of the exchange rate on
money demand, however, it was included in the equation (Kramer, 1996: 112n).
3
0 All variables have been taken from various issues of the Monthly Update of Russian Eco-
nomic Trends.26
M2R (real money demand) = log of (ruble) M2, deflated by consumer prices
REF (domestic interest rate) = (nominal) refinancing rate of the CBR
E (nominal exchange rate) = log of the current exchange rate of the ruble vis-a-vis the US-Dollar
DUMMY = dummy variable for the period after August 1993 (= 1) (= 0 before August 1993)
The interpretation of the results reported in equation (3
1) is only valid if the as-
sumptions of the linear regression model are not violated (Hansen, 1993). Most im-
portantly, the residuals e, in (3) should not contain any systematic information but
should rather be white noise. This implies that the expected value of the residuals
should be zero, i.e., that the regression parameters
3
1 and the variance of the re-
siduals should be constant (homoscedasticity), and that the residuals should not be
autocorrelated. Furthermore, the explanatory variables in X, should be weakly ex-
ogenous, and the residuals should be normally distributed.
The Breusch-Godfrey LM-Test tests the Ho-hypothesis of no autocorrelation
in the residuals. In the x
2-version of the test (Maddala, 1992: 251), the hypothesis
cannot be rejected if the respective x
2-value is sufficiently small. The critical x
2-value
at a 5-percent significance level is 9.49. With a value for a test of 4th-order autocor-
relation of 3.23, the hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals can thus not be
rejected. The same result is obtained for a test on first order autocorrelation. Without
including a dummy variable, the hypothesis that the residuals are heteroscedastic
could not be rejected on the basis of the White-test (F = 3.93 > F*). Visual inspection
of the residual plot without the dummy variable indicated that the residual variance
was greater in the period until August 1993 than afterwards.
3
2 Including the dummy
variable reduced the White test statistic to 1.76. The hypothesis that the residuals
are homoscedastic can thus not be rejected. Also, by including the variable, the
quality of the estimated equation in terms of its explanatory power and of the stability




In order to check whether the explanatory variables of the model are weakly
exogenous, they have been regressed on the error-correction-term, i.e., on the
lagged residuals of a regression of M2R on the levels of the explanatory variables
(Engle-Granger-equation) (Hansen, 1993: 103n). If the lagged residual turns out to
be insignificant in the EC-Model of the exchange rate and the interest rate, the vari-
3
1 See also Section 3.2.4.
3
2 Also, the CUSUM-of-Squares test indicated parameter instability of the series at about
this time.
3
3 One^fossible explanation of the negative impact of the dummy variable on money de-
mand/nay be that it captures an interest rate effect. According to this interpretation, the
gradual move to positive real interest rates since late 1993 increased the opportunity
costs of holding money and thus reduced money demand.27
ables can be considered weakly exogenous. In fact, none of the coefficients of the
lagged residual has been statistically significant.
The Jarque-Bera-Test tests the Ho-hypothesis that the residuals e, in (3) are
normally distributed (Graph 8). Ho is not rejected if the test statistic is sufficiently
small. The respective value of the test statistic is 1.64 and Ho is accepted at the
5-percent significant level.
Comparing the t-value of the lagged endogenous variable (-7.52) to the critical
value of the Kremers-Test for an equation with 3 exogenous variables shows that
there is statistical evidence for a stable money demand function. The null-hypothesis
of no cointegration (a0-i = O) is clearly rejected at the 1-percent significance level
(t* =-4.59) (Banerjee et al., 1992). The sign of the coefficient of the domestic inter-
est rate is in line with theoretical presumptions: ruble money demand reacts nega-
tively to a change in domestic interest rates. Money demand also declines if the
nominal exchange rate increases. This can be interpreted as evidence that the cur-
rent exchange rate is taken as an indicator of a future depreciation. A number of al-
ternative specifications of the return on assets denominated in foreign currency has
been tested:
• Using the exchange rate of the next period implies that households have perfect
foresight of the future exchange rate.
3
4 Again, a significant negative effect on
money demand was found while the remaining results changed very little. How-
ever, under this specification, the hypothesis that the residuals are autocorrelated
could not be rejected.
• The interest rate on 7-day US-Dollar deposits (London offer) was used to calculate
the return on foreign assets. However, no significant impact on ruble money de-
mand was found. One explanation of this result is that currency substitution in
Russia mainly takes the form of cash-Dollar holdings of households and firms.
Hence, the relevant rate of return on these assets is the (expected) rate of change
of the exchange rate, rather than the interest rate on off-shore Dollar deposits.
• Neither the current nor the future change in the exchange rate had a significantly
impact on money demand.
3
4 The assumption of rational expectations implies that economic agents forecast the future
exchange rate on the basis of the available information. For the implications of this as-
sumption on econometric modelling see Hansen (1993: 255n).28
The long-run coefficients of the exogenous variables can be obtained by set-
ting the short-run changes in the variables equal to zero
(M2R = M2R.,, REF = REF.j, and E = E.j) and solving for M2R:
(3") M2R = 2.97 - 0.002 REF - 0.13 E - 0.20 DUMMY
where i = 1,....,T. A 1 percent increase in the exchange rate, i.e., a depreciation of
the ruble by 1 percent, induces a 0.13 percent increase in the demand for ruble M2.
The (semi-)interest rate elasticity, in contrast, is very small: an increase in the refi-
nancing rate by 1 percentage point leads to a 0.002 percent decline in money de-
mand. There are two possible explanations for the extremely low interest rate elas-
ticity of money demand. First, a low interest rate elasticity can be expected if the
budget constraints of enterprises are soft. Enterprises would thus not react to price
signals. Conversely, a hardening of budget constraints through, for example, a more
rigorous enforcement of the bankruptcy law can be expected to lead to an increase
in the interest rate elasticity. Second, the official refinancing rate of the CBR that has
been used for the estimation is only a very inaccurate indicator of the true interest
rate level which is relevant for the portfolio decision of non-banks. Central bank credit
is increasingly allocated via credit auctions, and commercial banks' interest rates are
less than perfectly correlated with the refinancing rate. Yet, a similarly low value for
the interest rate elasticity was obtained when the interbank interest rate was used
instead.
3.2.4 Tests on a Structural Break in Money Demand
Finally, it has been analyzed whether evidence for a structural break in the
data could be found. General tests for parameter stability are the CUSUM and the
CUSUM-of-squares tests. These tests are based on the calculation of recursive re-
siduals and start by estimating the parameters of the model by successively adding
observations. The difference between the forecasted values and the actual values of
M2R give a time series for the recursive residuals. The test statistics then compare
the forecasted error with the standard deviation of the estimated equation when all T
observations have been used. If the values for the CUSUM and the CUSUM-of-
Squares test statistics remain within a certain interval of confidence, the Ho hypothe-
sis of parameter constancy cannot be rejected. Graph 7 shows that this is indeed the
case. The hypothesis that the estimated parameters have been constant throughout
the sample period cannot be rejected at a 5-percent significance level. Similarly,
CUSUNf-tests for the alternative parameter specifications described in Section 3.2.3
lead toteject the hypothesis of a structural break in the data.29
Tests for parameter stability can also be performed by comparing the residual
variance of a regression on a sub-sample of the observations with the residual vari-
ance of a regression on the entire sample (Chow-Test). In order to perform such a
test, an economically sensible breakpoint in the data must be selected. Because the
CBR and the government have agreed upon a monetary and fiscal stabilization pro-
gram at the beginning of 1995 (RETa, Vol. 5, No. 1), one may expect that this
agreement has induced a structural break in money demand. Expecting a qualitative
shift in the money supply process and a larger preference of the monetary authorities
for stability, households and firms may have adjusted their behavior. An n-step prob-
ability forecast-test on the basis of recursive residuals, however, does not indicate a
structural break in early 1995 (Graph 7). Also, Chow breakpoint and forecast tests for
a structural break in January 1995 lead to reject this hypothesis.
3
5 A dummy variable
fora structural break in January 1995 has turned out statistically insignificant as well.
The fact that a dummy variable for the time after August 1993 was significant in ex-
plaining money demand may imply that a structural break has taken place at this
time. However, on the basis of Chow tests, there is no evidence on a structural break
in the parameters in 1993.
3
5 The critical value for accepting Ho (no structural break) at a 5-percent significance level is
2.8, as opposed to the value of the F-statistic of 0.75 and 0.68, respectively.30
4. Conditions for Sustained Stabilization
In early 1995, the Russian government and the Central Bank have agreed
upon a program of monetary and fiscal stabilization. A number of factors do indeed
indicate that stabilization has since then become a more important target of Russian
economic policy. A positive and actually extremely high real interest rate on Central
Bank refinancing credit has been maintained throughout autumn 1996, an explicit
exchange rate target has been announced and adhered to since mid-1995, auctions
of Central Bank credit have gained in importance, and subsidized lending has been
cut down substantially. This implies that a quite significant structural break in the
process of base money supply has taken place.
However, the analysis has also shown that the CBR has experienced prob-
lems with the control of base money. Indirect budget financing still occurs, and the
fixed exchange rate regime that has been adopted causes a lack of control over the
monetary base. The control of the monetary authorities over broader monetary ag-
gregates is furthermore hampered by movements of the money multiplier, which are
influenced by the behavior of commercial banks and non-banks. Notwithstanding the
difficulties with controlling money supply, the CBR has been relatively successful in
containing money growth. Because adjustments of the currency ratio and of the re-
serve ratio can be interpreted as indicators of crises in the banking system, stabiliz-
ing the financial sector can substantially contribute to a more stable money supply
process. Measures to restructure and to consolidate the banking sector thus need to
be pursued. These should also aim at a solution to the problem of non-performing
loans on the balance sheet of banks. Facing higher lending risks, banks have re-
structured their portfolios away from loans to enterprises towards state bonds. To a
substantial degree, the tighter monetary policy has thus been accompanied by a shift
from corporate loans to loans to the government.
Despite the adjustments in the process of (base) money supply, money de-
mand has remained remarkably stable since the beginning of reforms. While reliable
estimates of money demand will have to be based on longer time series, some ten-
tative conclusions can be drawn. Although the income velocity of money has
changed during the transformation process, adjustments of money demand could to
a large extent be explained by changes in the opportunity costs of holding money, in
particular in the exchange rate. This, however, does not imply that a sound frame-
work for monetary targeting is given. Short-run fluctuations of money demand are
substantial, and further portfolio adjustments are likely to take place as inflationary
expectations decline and as the capital account becomes more open. No evidence31
for a significant structural break in the demand for real ruble M2 could be detected.
Some weak evidence could be found that a shift in money demand has occurred in
late 1993 which may be explained by the gradual move to positive real interest rates
that started at that time.
Sustained monetary stabilization crucially depends on the effectiveness with
which the CBR can defend its independence. Financial problems of the budgetary
sector- notably the erosion of real tax revenue and the increasing interest burden of
government debt - as well as insolvencies in the corporate and financial sector of the
Russian economy put substantial pressure on the CBR to ease its monetary stance.
In this situation, the Central Bank has fairly little room to maneuver. If, on the one
hand, it keeps monetary conditions relatively tight and thus real interest rates high,
investment credits will continue to be scarce. If, on the other hand, monetary condi-
tions are loosened too quickly, it may sacrifice its credibility not to bail out the gov-
ernment, insolvent firms, and distressed banks. It is thus crucial for the CBR to ad-
here to a transparent monetary policy, and to disseminate clear information about
monetary indicators on a regular basis. While some trial-and-error process is inevi-
table during transformation, transparency can help to minimize the destabilizing im-
pact that monetary policy can have for the the private sector.
The high level of real interest rates in the Russian economy does not only
cause a substantial misallocation of resources, it is also the reflection of a deep mis-
trust in reforms and of persistent inflationary expectations (DIW/lfW/IWH, 1996c).
Unilateral actions such as a lowering of CBR refinance rates are thus unlikely to
bring much relieve. Even worse, they may undermine central bank credibility, trigger
capital exports, and raise inflation. A superior strategy would thus be to open mar-
kets for foreign capital, and to allow foreigners to participate freely in the government
bond market. Such a liberalization of markets, while currently being opposed by the
incumbent banks which benefit from the high domestic interest rate spreads, would
increase the trust in sustained reforms. Sustained stabilization, however, cannot be
enforced by monetary policy alone. Rather, substantial structural adjustments in the
Russian economy - notably a solution to the governments financial problems and to
the arrears of enterprises - must be sought.32
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IFS).37







Net foreign assets 17.9 123.2 47.2 -4.8 42.9 44.1 65.1 -80.6 -24.7
Net domestic as- HB.1 -70.5 56.5 190.9 25.4 57.4 -23.3 157.1 88.0
sets
Other items (net) -36.0 47.3 -3.6 -86.1 31.7 -1.5 58.2 23.5 36.8
Sources: Various issues of IFS.38
Table 4 — Structure of the Balance Sheet of the Monetary Authorities, 1993-96
Foreign assets
Domestic credit






Deposits of the government
Capital accounts
Other items (net)

















































Source: International Monetary Fund (IFS).39



























































All variables are expressed in logarithms and have been seasonally adjusted. * = significant
at the 5-percent-level. For the critical values see Hansen (1993: 145n). — a) Indicates
whether a linear trend (T) and/or a constant term (C) has been included. - b) Maximum lag
length of the dependent variable. - c) Rvalue of an LM test on 1st (4th) order autocorrela-
tion. Critical values at the 5-percent level of confidence = 3.84 (9.49) (Maddala, 1992:
61 An).40
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Graph 3 — Real Monthly Interest Rates, 1992-96.
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Graph 6 — Level and Lagged Variables Underlying the ADF Tests (seasonally adjusted), 1992-96.44
Graph 7 — Tests on Parameter Stability: Cusum Tests and Recursive Residuals
Forecast Test.
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Graph 8 — Jarque-Bera Test on Normal Distribution of the Residuals.
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